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UNDERSTANDING THE RIGHTS OF DEAF 
AND HARD OF HEARING INDIVIDUALS TO 
MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN COURT 
PROCEEDINGS 
Douglas M. Pravda* 
Teri Mosier, a deaf lawyer, graduated from the Louis D. Brandeis 
School of Law at the University of Louisville in 1998, and was admitted 
to practice in the Commonwealth of Kentucky in 1999.1  In 2007, Mosier 
requested that the Commonwealth of Kentucky provide her with a sign 
language interpreter in order to represent clients in Kentucky’s Courts of 
Justice, the judicial system in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.2  The 
Commonwealth of Kentucky, through its Administrative Office of the 
Courts, refused to provide sign language interpreters for Mosier’s court 
appearances.3 
Scott Harrison, a lawyer with severe to profound hearing loss, 
practices criminal law in the State of Florida.4  Harrison spent more than 
seven years as an assistant public defender in Florida’s Ninth Judicial 
Circuit, which covers the Orlando area, during which time he handled 
approximately seventy criminal jury trials using a real-time court 
reporter provided by the State.5  Harrison then started a criminal defense 
practice in central Florida, and, in 2006, requested real-time court 
reporters to transcribe criminal trials and other hearings in certain 
judicial circuits.  His request was denied.6 
These are two recent examples in a lengthy and well-documented 
history of discriminatory treatment against the deaf and hard of hearing 
in the provision of meaningful access to court services.  In 2004, the 
Supreme Court recognized in Tennessee v. Lane that “[t]he unequal 
treatment of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services 
has a long history, and has persisted despite several legislative efforts to 
                                                 
* Counsel, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP.  The author wishes to thank 
Samson Enzer, Eric Stone, and Michael Stein for comments on drafts of this Article. 
1 Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier II), 675 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (E.D. Ky. 2009); see also TERI L. 
MOSIER PORTFOLIO, http://www.tlmosier.4t.com (providing biographical background). 
2 Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 695. 
3 Id. 
4 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive 
Relief and Compensatory Damages ¶¶ 13–15 Harrison v. Office of the State Courts Adm’r, 
2007 WL 1576351 (M.D. Fla. filed June 8, 2007) (No. 6:06-cv-1878) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s 
Second Amended Complaint]. 
5 Id. ¶¶ 17, 21. 
6 Id. ¶ 22. 
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remedy the problem of disability discrimination.”7  The Court explained 
that prior to the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(“ADA”), Congress learned “that many individuals, in many States 
across the country, were being excluded from courthouses and court 
proceedings by reason of their disabilities.”8  A congressional task force 
“heard numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with disabilities 
from state judicial services and programs, including exclusion of persons 
with visual impairments and hearing impairments from jury service 
[and] failure of state and local governments to provide interpretive 
services for the hearing impaired.”9 
For the deaf and hard of hearing, denial of accommodations is often 
tantamount to denial of access to the courts.  A deaf or hard of hearing 
lawyer like Mosier and Harrison, or a deaf or hard of hearing judge, 
party, juror, witness, or spectator who is unable to participate in a court 
proceeding for lack of an appropriate accommodation is plainly denied 
her right of access to the courts.  In enacting the ADA, Congress 
recognized that “failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will 
often have the same practical effect as outright exclusion.”10  The “duty 
to accommodate,” the Supreme Court held in Lane, “is perfectly 
consistent with the well-established due process principle that, ‘within 
the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard’ in its courts.”11   
This Article reviews the legal rights of deaf and hard of hearing 
individuals to appropriate courtroom accommodations.  Part I of this 
Article describes the primary sources of the legal rights of deaf and hard 
of hearing participants in the judicial system.  It discusses the legal rights 
of the deaf to accommodations in court proceedings under the ADA, the 
Rehabilitation Act, and the Court Interpreters Act, as well as Judicial 
Conference policy on interpreters in federal courts.  The Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”), which issues regulations implementing the ADA as it 
pertains to access to courts, has recently amended its regulations.  The 
new regulations, which became effective March 15, 2011, strengthen the 
existing rights of the deaf and hard of hearing to courtroom 
accommodations.  Part I also touches on advances in technology and on 
emerging technologies that permit courts to provide accommodations.  
The increase in the use and affordability of real-time reporting, in which 
a deaf or hard of hearing individual can obtain a simultaneous written 
                                                 
7 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004). 
8 Id. at 527. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 531. 
11 Id. at 532 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). 
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transcription of court proceedings, has the potential to increase the 
ability of deaf and hard of hearing participants to access the judicial 
system.  Other significant advances like remote video interpreting 
(though it will require significant investments in technology) offer the 
potential to alleviate a pressing problem in the availability of sign 
language interpreters. 
Although the legal rights to accommodations of all deaf and hard of 
hearing participants in the court system derive from the same laws, there 
are some variations in those rights depending on the capacity in which 
the deaf or hard of hearing individual is participating in the legal 
proceeding:  as lawyer, judge, litigant (criminal defendant or party to a 
civil proceeding), witness, juror, or spectator.  Part II of this Article uses 
recent vignettes, like those of Mosier and Harrison above, to discuss the 
legal rights of the deaf in each of these capacities.  These vignettes 
explore current issues in the law of courtroom access by the deaf and 
hard of hearing. 
As this Article shows below, the law has come a long way since the 
days when the deaf were routinely excluded from judicial proceedings.  
Today, the biggest obstacle to courtroom access for the deaf is lack of 
knowledge.  Many deaf individuals are unaware of their rights to such 
accommodations.  Judges and court clerks are often unaware that the 
deaf individuals generally have the right to such appropriate 
accommodations free of charge.  Many are unaware of the technologies 
that are available to provide accommodations to deaf and hard of 
hearing participants in the judicial system.  By highlighting the 
developments in the law and the technology, this Article aims to increase 
knowledge in order to ensure deaf and hard of hearing individuals full 
and equal access to the court system. 
I.  THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING PARTICIPANTS IN 
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
A. Legal Right to Accommodations in State and Local Courts 
The legal rights of deaf and hard of hearing lawyers to obtain 
accommodations in state courts, such as those in which Mosier and 
Harrison sought accommodations, are governed by the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehab Act”).12  Under the ADA and Rehab 
Act, state and local courts must provide and pay for accommodations for 
                                                 
12 See Marc Charmatz & Antoinette McRae, Access to the Courts:  A Blueprint for Successful 
Litigation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, 3 MARGINS:  MD. 
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 333 (Fall 2003) (containing a helpful overview of 
these laws). 
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deaf participants in legal proceedings, subject only to certain defenses 
such as unreasonable accommodation and undue burden. 
The ADA is a broad remedial statute that is designed to address a 
long and pervasive history of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities in areas such as employment, housing, education, and 
voting.13  Title II of the ADA addresses access to public services, 
including state and local court systems.  The anti-discrimination 
mandate of Title II is that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”14 
This mandate covers courtroom access for the deaf and hard of 
hearing in state and local courts.  First, the provision covers state and 
local courts.  The term “public entity” is defined to include “any State or 
local government” and “any department, agency, special purpose 
district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local 
government.”15  A state or local court system is an “instrumentality” of a 
state or local government.  The notes to the DOJ’s regulations 
implementing Title II explain that “public entities” include “the judicial 
branches of State and local governments.”16  Second, this provision 
covers participation in the legal proceedings in such courts.  The 
“services, programs, or activities” include the legal proceedings that take 
place in the courtroom.  For instance, in a section addressing the 
provision of auxiliary aids and services, the notes to the DOJ regulations 
implementing Title II explain that an effective aid for a deaf or hard of 
hearing individual in a courtroom could include “‘computer-assisted 
transcripts,’ which allow virtually instantaneous transcripts of 
courtroom argument and testimony to appear on displays.”17 
                                                 
13 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006). 
14 Id. § 12132. 
15 Id. § 12131(1)(A)–(B). 
16 28 C.F.R. Part 35, App. A, comment to § 35.102 (2010); see also Galloway v. Super. Ct. 
of D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12, 19 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that Superior Court was a public entity 
under Title II of the ADA). 
17 28 C.F.R. Part 35, App. A, comment to § 35.160 (2010); see also Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 
469, 472 (8th Cir. 1998) (exclusion of a mobility-impaired veteran from county quorum 
court due to his inability to access a second floor courtroom violated the ADA); Gregory v. 
Admin. Office of the Courts of N.J., 168 F. Supp. 2d 319, 331 (D.N.J. 2001) (finding that hard 
of hearing person stated a claim under the ADA when state officials denied his request to 
provide real-time transcription services in court proceedings); Soto v. City of Newark, 72 F. 
Supp. 2d 489, 494 (D.N.J. 1999) (determining that a municipal court was a “service, 
program or activity” of a public entity when it conducted weddings at the municipal 
courthouse); Santiago v. Garcia, 70 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.P.R. 1999) (finding that a hard of 
hearing litigant in civil trial stated a prima facie claim under the ADA for exclusion from 
courtroom proceedings due to inability to follow those proceedings); Matthews v. 
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Third, this provision covers the participation by deaf and hard of 
hearing individuals.  The term “qualified individual with a disability” is 
defined as 
an individual with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, 
the removal of architectural, communication, or 
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids 
and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements 
for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity.18 
A person who is deaf or hard of hearing is an individual with a 
disability.  The ADA defines the term “disability” to include a physical 
impairment that “substantially limits one or more major life activities” 
and defines “major life activities” to include “hearing.”19  In the context 
of courtroom access, the deaf or hard of hearing individual will virtually 
always be a “qualified” individual with a disability.  For instance, the 
deaf or hard of hearing lawyer seeking accommodations in state or local 
courts will presumably be licensed or admitted to practice in that court 
and will therefore meet the “essential eligibility requirements” for 
participation in court proceedings.  Similarly, a deaf litigant or witness 
also meets the eligibility requirements as he or she is entitled to 
participate in courtroom proceedings by virtue of his or her status as a 
plaintiff or defendant or witness in a case.  A deaf or hard of hearing 
juror is “qualified” under the ADA because he or she has been called to 
serve as a juror.20 
Like the ADA, the Rehab Act was designed to address 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to provide them 
with the tools necessary to achieve equality of opportunity and full 
inclusion in society in areas such as employment, housing, education, 
voting, and public services.21  Section 504 of the Rehab Act provides that 
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by 
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
                                                                                                             
Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 534 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (finding that failure to accommodate 
paraplegic by scheduling court proceedings in an accessible courtroom violated ADA). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). 
19 Id. § 12102(1)(A), (2)(A) (Supp. II 2008). 
20 Cf. Galloway, 816 F. Supp. at 18–20 (holding that blind persons were “otherwise 
qualified” to serve as jurors and that District of Columbia superior court’s policy of 
excluding blind persons from jury duty violated the ADA). 
21 See generally Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
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program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”22  In the 
context of courtroom access, the standards applicable for a Rehab Act 
claim are identical to those under Title II of the ADA.  The only 
difference is that the Rehab Act applies only to state or local courts that 
receive federal financial assistance. 
B. Legal Right to Accommodations in Federal Courts 
Federal courts are not subject to the ADA or the Rehab Act.23  
Instead, the legal rights to accommodations in federal courts are 
governed by the Court Interpreters Act of 1978 and by judicial policy.  
Under the Court Interpreters Act, the presiding judicial officer shall 
appoint an interpreter at court expense “in judicial proceedings 
instituted by the United States” when the judicial officer determines, 
either on his own or by motion of a party, that 
such party (including a defendant in a criminal case), or 
a witness who may present testimony in such judicial 
proceedings . . .  
. . . . 
suffers from a hearing impairment . . . so as to inhibit 
such party’s comprehension of the proceedings or 
communication with counsel or the presiding judicial 
officer, or so as to inhibit such witness’ comprehension 
of questions and the presentation of such testimony.24 
The Act provides no automatic right to an interpreter.  Rather, it is 
left to the “presiding judicial officer”—meaning a United States district 
judge, bankruptcy judge, magistrate judge, or the United States Attorney 
with respect to grand jury proceedings25—to determine whether to 
provide such an interpreter.26  In practice, however, the presiding 
judicial officer’s discretion is typically exercised in cases involving 
requests for foreign language interpreters (which are also covered by the 
                                                 
22 Id. § 504; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
23 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)–(b) (showing that the relevant “program or activity” under the 
Rehab Act refers only to states and local governments or to any executive agency (not 
judicial branch) of the federal government); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (showing that the 
Americans with Disabilities Act defines public entities only in terms of states and local 
governments). 
24 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (2006). 
25 Id. § 1827(i) (defining “presiding judicial officer”). 
26 Cf. United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting, in the context of 
a request for a foreign language interpreter, that there is no automatic right to an 
interpreter under the Court Interpreters Act). 
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Act) where there may be a question as to the degree to which a party or 
witness understands and communicates in English.27  With a deaf or 
hard of hearing party or witness, it is more obvious that the individual’s 
impairment inhibits his comprehension of the proceedings. 
The primary limitation of this Act is that it requires an interpreter to 
be appointed at court expense only in judicial proceedings instituted by 
the United States.  The statute therefore covers all federal criminal 
matters (which must be brought by the federal government), including 
pretrial and grand jury proceedings, but does not cover most civil 
matters (which are primarily brought by private litigants, not by the 
government).28 
Even where a proceeding is not instituted by the United States, the 
Act also permits—but does not require—the presiding judicial officer to 
appoint at court expense 
a certified or otherwise qualified sign language 
interpreter to provide services to a party, witness, or 
other participant in a judicial proceeding . . . if the 
presiding judicial officer determines, on such officer’s 
own motion or on the motion of a party or other 
participant in the proceeding, that such individual 
suffers from a hearing impairment.29 
This provision vests “judicial officers with the discretion to provide sign 
language interpreters at court expense, subject to the availability of 
funds, to any participant in any type of judicial proceeding.”30 
A second limitation of this Act is that it requires an interpreter to be 
appointed at court expense only for a party or for a witness.  The Act 
permits an interpreter to be appointed at court expense for “other 
participant[s] in a judicial proceeding” if “such individual suffers from a 
hearing impairment,” but again does not require the appointment of an 
interpreter for such other participants.31 
                                                 
27 E.g. United States v. Black, 369 F.3d 1171, 1174–75 (10th Cir. 2004) (denying interpreter 
for witness who asked to testify in Navajo language because witness was able to give clear 
and responsive answers in English throughout her testimony). 
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(j) (“[J]udicial proceedings instituted by the United States” include 
all such proceedings “whether criminal or civil, including pretrial and grand jury 
proceedings conducted in, or pursuant to the lawful authority and jurisdiction of a United 
States district court” (parenthetical omitted)). 
29 § 1827(l). 
30 S. REP. No. 104–366, at 35 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 4215. 
31 28 U.S.C. § 1827(l).  Defendants who have been denied an interpreter request under 
the Court Interpreters Act have appealed that denial on the grounds that the presiding 
judicial officer abused his discretion.  See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 659–
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This law has been supplemented by official federal policy of the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.  In September 1995, 
“the Judicial Conference adopted a policy that all federal courts provide 
reasonable accommodations to persons with communications 
disabilities” and directed the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts to develop written guidelines to implement this policy.32  The 
written guidelines prepared by the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts and adopted by the Judicial Conference in March 1996, 
provide the following:  “Each federal court is required to provide, at 
judiciary expense, sign language interpreters or other appropriate 
auxiliary aids or services to participants in federal court proceedings 
who are deaf, hearing-impaired, or have other communications 
disabilities.”33  Under the federal policy, “‘[c]ourt [p]roceedings’ include 
trials, hearings, ceremonies and other public programs or activities 
conducted by a court,” and “‘[p]articipants’ in court proceedings include 
parties, attorneys, and witnesses.”34 
C. What Accommodations Are Required? 
These laws provide that the deaf and hard of hearing have legal 
rights to obtain accommodations in court proceedings.  But to what 
accommodations are the deaf or hard of hearing participants entitled?  In 
state and local courts, where accommodations are governed by the ADA 
and the Rehab Act, the DOJ regulations implementing Title II explain 
what public entities must do to comply with the anti-discrimination 
mandate that a public entity may not exclude a qualified individual with 
a disability from participation in or deny the benefits of their services, 
programs, or activities.  Two provisions are particularly relevant to the 
issue of courtroom access.  First, “[a] public entity shall make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the 
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the 
                                                                                                             
63 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion under the Court 
Interpreters Act by failing to appoint a second interpreter to enable non-English speaking 
defendants to communicate with counsel while the first interpreter was interpreting the 
ongoing court proceedings). 
32 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 13–
14 (Mar. 12, 1996), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/96-Mar.pdf. 
33 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, 
vol. 1, ch. III, pt. H, at 37–39 (Guidelines for Providing Services to the Hearing-Impaired 
and Other Persons with Communications Disabilities) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.nad.org/issues/justice/courts/communication-
access-federal-courts. 
34 Id. 
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modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, 
program, or activity.”35  Second, “[a] public entity shall furnish 
appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an 
individual with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and 
enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity conducted by a 
public entity.”36 
The ADA defines “auxiliary aids and services” to include “qualified 
interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered 
materials available to individuals with hearing impairments.”37  The DOJ 
recently amended its regulations implementing Title II of the ADA.  The 
amended regulations, which took effect March 15, 2011, set forth a 
number of specific examples of “auxiliary aids and services,” including 
[q]ualified interpreters on-site or through video remote 
interpreting (VRI) services; notetakers; real-time 
computer-aided transcription services; written materials; 
exchange of written notes; telephone handset amplifiers; 
assistive listening devices; assistive listening systems; 
telephones compatible with hearing aids; closed caption 
decoders; open and closed captioning, including real-
time captioning; voice, text, and video-based 
telecommunications products and systems, including 
text telephones (TTYs), videophones, and captioned 
telephones, or equally effective telecommunications 
devices; videotext displays; accessible electronic and 
information technology; or other effective methods of 
making aurally delivered information available to 
individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing.38 
A number of these “auxiliary aids and services” are particularly 
appropriate for courtroom settings.  Qualified sign language interpreters 
who are familiar with legal concepts and can communicate them in sign 
language will often be the most effective auxiliary aid for a deaf or hard 
of hearing individual who primarily communicates in sign language.  
Real-time computer-aided transcription services are effective for those 
with appropriate reading comprehension skills.  Assistive listening 
systems or devices, such as infrared systems or FM systems, could be 
appropriate for others who have some degree of hearing.  Oral 
                                                 
35 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2010). 
36 Id. § 35.160(b)(1). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006). 
38 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 
75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,177 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
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interpreters could be an effective accommodation for those who lipread 
but lack strong reading comprehension skills. 
The DOJ regulations provide that the public entity must give 
“primary consideration” to the type of accommodation requested by the 
individual with the disability in determining what accommodation is 
appropriate.39  It would not help a deaf person who lipreads and does 
not communicate in sign language, for instance, for a public entity to 
provide that person with a sign language interpreter.  Likewise, real-time 
transcription might not be an appropriate accommodation for a person 
who communicates in sign language and is far more accustomed to 
receiving information in sign language than any other method.  Thus, the 
public entity must provide deference to the type of accommodation 
requested by the deaf or hard of hearing individual in order to ensure 
that the accommodation provided is appropriate to the person making 
the request. 
The amended DOJ regulations set forth that required level of 
deference: 
The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure 
effective communication will vary in accordance with 
the method of communication used by the individual; 
the nature, length, and complexity of the communication 
involved; and the context in which the communication is 
taking place.  In determining what types of auxiliary 
aids and services are necessary, a public entity shall give 
primary consideration to the requests of individuals 
with disabilities.  In order to be effective, auxiliary aids 
and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a 
timely manner, and in such a way as to protect the 
privacy and independence of the individual with a 
disability.40 
The cost of these accommodations must be borne by the public entity, 
not by the deaf or hard of hearing lawyer seeking the accommodation.  
As the DOJ regulation explains, “[a] public entity may not place a 
                                                 
39 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2). 
40 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 56,184. The amended regulations also provide that “[a] public entity shall 
not require an individual with a disability to bring another individual to interpret for him 
or her” and “shall not rely on [any] adult accompanying [the] individual with a disability 
[to provide interpreting services], except . . . [w]here the individual with [the] disability 
specifically requests that the accompanying adult [provide the services and such 
interpreting would be] appropriate under the circumstances.”  Id. 
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surcharge on a particular individual with a disability . . . to cover the cost 
of measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids or program 
accessibility, that are required to provide that individual . . . with the 
non-discriminatory treatment required by the Act.”41 
The federal Judicial Conference policy covering accommodations in 
federal courts is similar to the ADA.  Under the federal policy, the 
definition of “auxiliary aids and services” tracks that under the ADA by 
instructing federal courts to provide “qualified interpreters, assistive 
listening devices or systems, or other effective methods of making 
aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing 
impairments” and to give “primary consideration to a participant’s 
choice of auxiliary aid or service.”42  The policy defines “primary 
consideration” to mean that 
the court is to honor a participant’s choice of auxiliary 
aid or service, unless it can show that another equally 
effective means of communication is available, or that 
the use of the means chosen would result in a 
fundamental alteration in the nature of the court 
proceeding or in undue financial or administrative 
burden.43 
The federal policy also mentions computer-assisted real-time 
reporting.  The policy explains that where a court determines such real-
time reporting to be appropriate, it “is one of the services that may be 
provided under these guidelines.”44  However, the policy explains that 
such real-time reporting is limited to the purpose of providing 
accommodations for those with communications disabilities.  It is not 
intended to serve as an official court record and is not required to offer 
features such as key word searches for the benefit of the attorneys or 
parties using the service.45 
D. New or More Advanced Accommodations Are Now Available 
Many accommodations that are available to deaf and hard of hearing 
participants in the judicial system today have been available for many 
years.  Sign language interpreters, notetakers, open and closed 
captioning, and other similar accommodations have been used for years 
                                                 
41 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f). 
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to allow deaf people to access the court system.  However, a number of 
new technologies have emerged or become significantly more advanced 
in the last decade that, if properly made available, could ensure that no 
deaf or hard of hearing individual will lack the ability to participate 
meaningfully in courtroom proceedings. 
1. Real-Time Transcriptions 
One significant development is the advent of real-time transcription 
services, such as Communication Access Realtime Translation (“CART”).  
A real-time transcription is a near simultaneous written transcript of the 
proceedings.  The provider uses stenography shorthand to capture 
everything that is said in the courtroom.  Computer software, such as 
LiveNote or CaseView programs, converts that shorthand into standard 
English.  The recipient can view the resulting transcription on a 
computer screen in real time.46  While real-time transcription is used in 
classrooms, conferences, and conventions, and to caption live television 
broadcasts, Broadway plays, and sporting events, this technology is 
particularly appropriate for use in a courtroom setting.  In many courts, 
court reporters already record proceedings by stenographic means in 
order to prepare verbatim transcripts of court proceedings.  With the 
appropriate hardware and software, the court reporter could provide the 
transcription of the proceedings in real-time for the benefit of deaf and 
hard of hearing participants.47 
It has become more and more common in recent years for lawyers 
and judges who are not deaf to use real-time transcriptions during court 
proceedings.  A judge can use a real-time transcription to look back at 
earlier testimony during a lawyer’s examination of a witness.  A lawyer 
can make a private annotation on the real-time transcription for use 
during cross-examination, closing argument, or jury instructions.48  
                                                 
46 See Communication Access Realtime Translation, NAT’L CT. REPS. ASS’N, 
http://ncraonline.org/NR/rdonlyres/6556B2C5-B5DB-4DD9-8393-743EFE5933A4/0/ 
CARTmarketingbrochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) (providing a brochure that gives a 
useful overview of realtime captioning and CART services). 
47 See Certified Realtime Reporter (CRR), NAT’L CT. REPS. ASS’N, http://ncraonline.org/ 
certification/Certification/crr/default.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) (explaining what a 
certified real-time reporter service is and how it functions).  Not every court reporter can 
provide a meaningful real-time feed.  To provide an effective real-time transcript, a 
reporter must be able to provide a high degree of accuracy on the fly without going back to 
correct errors.  See id. (explaining that the National Court Reporters Association requires 
96% accuracy for five minutes at a speed of 180 words per minute for a court reporter to be 
certified as a real-time reporter). 
48 See Fredric I. Lederer, Wired:  What We’ve Learned About Courtroom Technology, 24 CRIM. 
JUST. 18, 23 (2010) (explaining the benefits of courtroom technology). 
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Many lawyers now use real-time transcription services at depositions to 
get a live transcript of the deponent’s testimony. 
In short, independent of the benefit such transcriptions provide for a 
deaf or hard of hearing individual, these real-time transcriptions are 
becoming much more prevalent throughout the legal profession.  As a 
result, the services offered by real-time reporters are becoming 
increasingly available and are not limited to situations in which a full-
time court reporter is present in a courtroom to record the proceedings.  
Even courts that do not routinely record proceedings via use of court 
reporters can hire them on an as-needed basis to provide transcription 
services for the deaf.  Such services can also be provided remotely, by 
court reporters not physically present in the courtroom.  Automated real-
time transcription is a work-in-progress, but it offers the promise of 
making real-time transcriptions available to more individuals at 
substantially lower costs.49 
With emerging technologies, however, come significantly more 
advanced technological know-how to operate them.  Real-time 
transcription requires that the court reporter’s stenography machine 
“talk to” the laptop computer on which the deaf individual is reading the 
real-time transcription.  Based on personal experience, if the program 
does not work at the outset, the court reporters and court technical 
specialists are not always able to get the transcription program to work.  
This problem, however, should disappear with more frequent training 
and experience in these programs. 
2. Remote Video Interpreting 
A second significant development has been the rise of remote 
interpreting services.  Sign language interpreters have long been used in 
courtrooms to provide accommodations to those who communicate via 
sign language.  But one of the biggest problems confronting those who 
need such interpreters is their lack of availability.  A deaf defendant who 
shows up in court for arraignment may find that there is no sign 
language interpreter available at that time to provide interpreting 
services.  Remote video interpreting obviates the need for a court system 
to have a qualified sign language interpreter on-site or on-call at all times 
by permitting use of interpreters who are in a different location. 
The amended DOJ regulations implementing Title II specifically 
recognize video remote interpreting as an appropriate auxiliary aid and 
service.  Those regulations make clear, however, that the video and 
audio feed must be sufficient to permit “high-quality video images.”  
                                                 
49 Id. 
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The regulation provides that a public entity that chooses to provide 
remote interpreting services 
shall ensure that it provides— 
 (1) Real-time, full-motion video and audio over a 
dedicated high-speed, wide-bandwidth video 
connection or wireless connection that delivers high-
quality video images that do not produce lags, choppy, 
blurry, or grainy images, or irregular pauses in 
communication; 
 (2) A sharply delineated image that is large enough 
to display the interpreter's face, arms, hands, and 
fingers, and the participating individual’s face, arms, 
hands, and fingers, regardless of his or her body 
position; 
 (3) A clear, audible transmission of voices; and 
 (4) Adequate training to users of the technology 
and other involved individuals so that they may quickly 
and efficiently set up and operate the [remote video 
services].50 
Although remote video interpreting obviates the need for a sign 
language interpreter to be physically present and therefore could make 
remote interpreting more widespread, it requires that the public entity 
make a significant investment in technological capabilities in order to 
meet the standard set forth in the DOJ regulations. 
3. Assistive Listening Technology 
A deaf or hard of hearing lawyer may also be able to use assistive 
listening devices to practice in a courtroom.  In a recent article, a deaf 
lawyer with a cochlear implant described handling a bench trial using 
assistive listening devices.  The judge and witnesses spoke into 
microphones placed in front of them, while opposing counsel used 
portable wireless microphones that could be clipped onto their ties or 
suit jackets.  Each of these microphones broadcast to an infrared 
transmitter, which in turn transmitted to a portable receiver connected to 
the speech processor of the deaf lawyer’s cochlear implant.51 
                                                 
50 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 
75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,184 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
51 See Brian D. Sheridan, Hearing at the Hearing:  Using Assistive Listening Technology in the 
Courtroom, 84 MICH. B.J. 32, 33 (2005). 
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Other similar assistive listening devices are available and can be 
modified in ways specific to the individual recipient.  For instance, if the 
deaf lawyer used a hearing aid rather than a cochlear implant, the 
transmission from the infrared transmitter could have fed into a 
neckloop, which allows a hearing aid containing a telecoil (or T-coil) 
switch to pick up the transmission.52  While amplification and FM 
technologies are not new, the advances in wireless technology and the 
clarity of the sound that is being transmitted make this a much better 
option for those who are deaf or hard of hearing than it was in the past. 
4. Universal Design Principles 
Courtrooms today are being designed or retrofitted with “universal 
design” principles in mind, meaning that all participants can take 
advantage of the technologies offered.53  Many trial courtrooms, 
particularly in federal courts across the country, are now high-tech.  
They have flat-screen monitors for counsel, judges, witnesses, and often 
jurors to view presentations in opening and closing statements, 
documents shown to the witnesses, and other evidence presented at 
trial.54  These technologies allow all participants in the courtroom—
whether deaf or hearing—to benefit.  As noted above, some courtrooms 
offer real-time captioning to all participants, including the lawyers, 
judges, and jurors.  Thus, regardless of whether a deaf or hard of hearing 
person is a participant in the court proceeding, all participants can take 
advantage of the real-time transcription to read as well as hear the 
testimony of a witness. 
The deaf lawyer with the cochlear implant who used assistive 
listening technology at trial noted that the transmission that was fed to 
his cochlear implant was also transmitted to loudspeakers placed around 
the courtroom, thus benefiting all the people in the courtroom, including 
the court reporter and spectators.55  The lawyer also noted that the court 
subsequently acquired additional wireless microphones and has used 
them in trials not involving any deaf or hard of hearing individuals 
because they provide for greater ease in understanding what others have 
said.56 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 See Peter Blanck, Ann Wilichowski & James Schmeling, Disability Civil Rights Law and 
Policy:  Accessible Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 825, 836 (2004). 
54 See Lederer, supra note 48, at 19–20 (reporting an estimate from the Department of 
Justice that 95% of federal trial courtrooms are high-tech). 
55 Sheridan, supra note 51, at 33. 
56 Id. 
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Although these technologies are now more widely available and 
new state of the art technologies for providing accommodations will 
emerge, the DOJ regulations do not mandate that public entities adopt 
new and emerging technologies to provide accommodations.  In the 
notes to the definition of “auxiliary aids and services,” the DOJ 
regulation notes that “although the definition [of auxiliary aids and 
services] would include ‘state of the art’ devices, public entities are not 
required to use the newest or most advanced technologies as long as the 
auxiliary aid or service that is selected affords effective 
communication.”57 
II.  THE LAW AS APPLIED TO DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING PARTICIPANTS 
A. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Lawyer 
In 2007, it was reported that there are at least 170 deaf lawyers 
practicing in the United States.58  That number is likely to grow 
substantially as the legal rights enshrined in the ADA have produced a 
new generation of deaf and hard of hearing individuals with greater 
access to education and other resources and who are now attending and 
graduating from law school in greater numbers than ever before.  Given 
the relatively few deaf lawyers, it is not surprising that Kentucky and 
Florida (the states in which Mosier and Harrison requested 
accommodations) do not have established policies for providing 
accommodations to deaf and hard of hearing lawyers.  Nevertheless, the 
ADA and the Rehab Act plainly require the states to provide such 
accommodations. 
At the time that she first requested a sign language interpreter for 
court appearances, Mosier worked for Kentucky’s Department of Public 
Advocacy.59  Initially and for three months thereafter, the Kentucky 
Office of Vocational Rehabilitation provided sign language interpreters 
for Mosier’s court appearances.60  At the end of those three months, 
however, Kentucky refused to provide further sign language interpreters 
for Mosier’s court appearances.61  Mosier later left the Department of 
Public Advocacy and became a solo practitioner.62  In 2008, Mosier 
brought a complaint against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, its 
                                                 
57 28 C.F.R. Part 35, App. A, comment to § 35.104 (2010). 
58 See, e.g., Mike, Deaf Judges, KOKONUT PUNDIT (July 15, 2007, 1:18 AM), 
http://kokonutpundits.blogspot.com/2007/07/deaf-judges.html. 
59 Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier II), 675 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (E.D. Ky. 2009). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 696. 
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Administrative Office of the Courts, and several individuals in their 
official capacities for failing to provide qualified sign language 
interpreters for her court appearances.  Mosier sought injunctive and 
monetary relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.63  The Commonwealth of Kentucky raised 
a multitude of defenses in two motions to dismiss and a motion for 
summary judgment, all of which were rejected. 
First, defendants argued that a Kentucky statute that authorizes 
interpreters for the deaf or hard of hearing provides that such qualified 
interpreters shall be provided for those who are “parties, jurors, or 
witnesses.”64  Based on this statute, defendants argued that it could not 
provide interpreters for “attorneys.”  Indeed, the Administrative Office 
of the Kentucky Courts had adopted an administrative policy that it does 
“not provide interpreting services for attorneys, public defenders, law 
enforcement officers, jail officials, other state agency employees, social 
workers or mental health workers.”65  The court rejected this argument, 
finding that a different Kentucky statute required recipients of 
government funding to ensure equal access for individuals with a 
disability and that it would make no sense to require the government to 
provide such access but not to authorize the expenditure necessary to 
comply with the statute.66 
Second, defendants argued that Mosier’s claims fell within Title I, 
rather than Title II, of the ADA and that her employer was therefore 
obligated to provide her with accommodations.67  Since Mosier was self-
employed, the argument boiled down to the contention that Mosier 
should bear the cost of her own accommodations.  The court rejected that 
argument, finding that Mosier’s claim was properly asserted under Title 
II because the broad language “services, programs or activities” under 
Title II encompassed the court proceedings for which she sought 
accommodations.68 
Third, defendants argued that Mosier’s ADA claim was barred by 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s sovereign immunity.69  The Eleventh 
Amendment grants the States immunity from “any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted . . . by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
                                                 
63 Id. at 694. 
64 Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss at 3–4 Mosier II, 675 
F. Supp. 2d 693 (No. 08-CV-184-KSF) (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30A.410(1) (2008)). 
65 Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 695. 
66 Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier I), 640 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (citing KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 344.120–.130 (2008)). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 878–79. 
69 Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 699. 
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or Subject of any Foreign State.”70  Despite the absence of any reference 
to immunity for suits brought by a State’s own citizens for violations of 
federal law, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh 
Amendment to grant such immunity based on the sovereignty the States 
enjoyed prior to the Constitution’s ratification, so long as the States have 
not consented to such a suit.71 
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits by citizens against state 
officials for prospective injunctive relief.72  The Mosier court therefore 
rejected the Commonwealth’s claim of immunity as a defense to Mosier’s 
request for injunctive relief.73  The Eleventh Amendment also does not 
bar suits by citizens against States for money damages in the area of 
access to judicial services pursuant to Title II of the ADA.  The Supreme 
Court considered this precise question in 2004 in Tennessee v. Lane.  In 
Lane, a paraplegic was scheduled to appear in court to answer criminal 
charges.74  He arrived at the courthouse at the time of his scheduled 
appearance, but the courtroom was on the second floor of a county 
courthouse that had no elevator.75  After Lane refused to suffer the 
indignity of crawling or being carried up the stairs (as he had for a prior 
hearing), he was arrested and jailed for failure to appear at his hearing.76  
Lane subsequently sued the State for money damages under Title II of 
the ADA.  Based on its findings that “Congress enacted Title II against a 
backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state 
services and programs, including systematic deprivations of 
fundamental rights” and that decisions of other courts had 
“demonstrate[d] a pattern of unconstitutional treatment in the 
administration of justice,”77 the Supreme Court held that Congress had 
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity “as it applies to the class of 
cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.”78  Thus, 
                                                 
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
71 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72–73 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 710–13 (1999) (“[T]he 
sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the 
Eleventh Amendment.  Rather, as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the 
authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a 
fundamental aspect of [their] sovereignty . . . .”). 
72 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). 
73 Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 699. 
74 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004). 
75 Id. at 513–14. 
76 Id. at 514. 
77 Id. at 524, 525 (citing, for example, Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 1132–33 (5th Cir. 
1978) (deaf criminal defendant denied interpretive services), opinion withdrawn as moot, 573 
F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1978); State v. Schaim, 600 N.E.2d 661, 672 (Ohio 1992) (same); People v. 
Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (same)). 
78 Id. at 533–34. 
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the Mosier court, applying the holding of Tennessee v. Lane, held that 
Congress had validly abrogated the Commonwealth’s immunity from 
suit in cases “implicating the accessibility of judicial services,” and 
therefore Mosier could bring a claim against the Commonwealth for 
money damages for a violation of Title II of the ADA.79 
Fourth, the defendants in Mosier argued that they did not 
intentionally discriminate against Mosier based on her disability, but 
rather based on her status as an attorney because they were statutorily 
barred from providing interpreting services to anyone not a party, 
witness, or juror.80  The court rejected this argument, holding that a 
showing of discriminatory intent was not necessary to sustain a claim for 
violation of the ADA.81  Discriminatory intent is necessary only to 
sustain a claim for monetary damages under the ADA, not a claim for 
injunctive relief.82 
Fifth, defendants argued that the Rehab Act claim failed because 
Mosier could not meet the requirement that she was denied an 
interpreter solely because of her disability as opposed to her status as an 
attorney.83  The court held that Mosier’s claim was based on her being 
treated differently than hearing attorneys with regard to access to court 
services, and that whether defendants discriminated against her on the 
basis of her disability was a question for the trier of fact.84 
Mosier also moved for summary judgment on her own claims for 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  The court held that Mosier qualified for 
protection under the ADA and the Rehab Act, rejecting defendants’ 
argument that Mosier was not entitled to such accommodations as an 
attorney.85  The court left for trial, however, the questions of whether 
Mosier’s requested accommodation was a reasonable one and whether 
the State’s services were “readily accessible to and useable by 
individuals with disabilities.”86 
Following the court’s ruling, the parties reached a settlement of 
Mosier’s claim.  Without admitting any violation of the ADA or Rehab 
                                                 
79 Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier II) , 675 F. Supp. 2d 693, 699 (E.D. Ky. 2009). 
80 Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier I), 640 F. Supp. 2d 857, 877–78 (E.D. Ky. 2009). 
81 Id. at 878. 
82 See, e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). 
83 Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 698–99. 
84 Id.  Defendants also made a variety of procedural arguments not discussed here, all of 
which were rejected.  See Mosier v. Kentucky, No. 08-184-KSF, 2008 WL 4191510, at *2–3 
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 11, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief 
under the ADA or the Rehab Act); Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 696–97 (denying motion for 
summary judgment based on lack of standing); id. at 697–98 (denying motion for summary 
judgment on statute of limitations grounds). 
85 Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 700. 
86 Id. at 701. 
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Act, the defendants—as well as Mosier—recited that they entered into 
the settlement agreement “to further enhance access to the court system 
for persons who are deaf or hard of hearing.”87  As part of the settlement, 
the Kentucky Courts of Justice agreed to change their accommodations 
policy to “provide interpreting services or auxiliary aids and services, at 
its own expense, for eligible attorneys, but only for in-court proceedings 
and court-ordered proceedings in which court personnel are directly 
involved.”88  An “eligible attorney” is defined as “an attorney who is a 
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA because he or she is 
deaf or hard of hearing and who has complied with the procedures 
promulgated by the [Kentucky Courts of Justice] for requesting an 
interpreter or auxiliary aids.”89  The settlement provides that the 
presiding judge in a court proceeding in which an eligible attorney 
requests accommodations may request written documentation 
establishing that the attorney is disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA.90  As under the ADA regulations, “the Presiding Judge will give 
primary consideration to the specific auxiliary aid or service requested 
by that attorney,” but the eligible attorney must engage in an interactive 
process with the court to permit the presiding judge to evaluate how to 
provide interpreting services or auxiliary aids and services.91 
Interestingly, and consistent with defendants’ argument that 
Mosier’s employer should pay for the accommodation under Title I of 
the ADA, the settlement agreement permits the Administrative Office of 
the Courts to ask for reimbursement from the eligible attorney’s 
employer, though it does not guarantee that any reimbursement will be 
provided.92  Mosier herself was deemed to have qualified as an eligible 
attorney without the need to submit verifying documentation confirming 
her disability, to have permanently established the need for interpreting 
services or auxiliary aids, and to be provided interpreting services or 
                                                 
87 Settlement Agreement and General Release of All Claims, Recitals at E, Mosier II, 675 
F. Supp. 2d 693 (No. 08-CV-184-KSF) [hereinafter Mosier Settlement Agreement]. 
88 Id. at Covenants at II.B.1. 
89 Id. at II.B.3. 
90 Id. at II.B.4. 
91 Id. at II.B.6–7. 
92 Id. at II.B.11.  Because Title I of the ADA requires an employer (who falls within the 
definition provided in the ADA) to provide reasonable accommodations to its employees, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) & (b)(5)(A), the Administrative Office of the Courts evidently 
believes that the employer should accept joint responsibility for the provision of 
accommodations.  The ADA does not provide any guidance on the question of joint 
responsibility. 
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auxiliary aids pursuant to the revised policy.93  Mosier also received a 
payment of $120,000 from defendants as part of the settlement.94 
Like Mosier, Harrison brought an ADA claim after denial of his 
request for real-time transcription.  In his criminal defense practice, 
Harrison requested and received real-time court reporters to transcribe 
criminal trials and other hearings in the First, Seventh, and Tenth 
Judicial Circuits.95  However, he was denied similar accommodations in 
the Ninth and Eighteenth Judicial Circuits.96  In December 2006, Harrison 
brought suit against the Office of the State Courts Administrator and 
various related individuals and entities for failure to provide real-time 
court reporters for Harrison’s criminal trials and court appearances.  
Harrison sought injunctive and monetary relief for violations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.97 
Harrison moved for a preliminary injunction seeking a court order 
directing that defendants provide him with a real-time court reporter for 
state court criminal jury trials until the court made a final ruling.98  The 
court denied his request, finding that he had not established a likelihood 
of success on the merits.99  The court also found that he had not 
established a likelihood of irreparable injury because he had failed to 
provide evidence of any upcoming jury trials in which he would need 
accommodations.100 
Like Mosier, Harrison settled his case with the state.  Without 
admitting any liability or any violation of the ADA, the State of Florida 
agreed to provide Harrison with “Real-time Transcription Services” at its 
own expense “in criminal trials in county and circuit court” and to 
ensure that the court reporter “shall provide a laptop and all 
connectivity to Plaintiff for use in the criminal trial.”101  The agreement 
                                                 
93 Id. at II.B.4, 6, 8 & II.D. 
94 Id. at IV.A. 
95 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 21. 
96 Id. ¶ 22. 
97 Harrison v. Office of the State Courts Adm’r, No. 6:06-cv-1878, 2007 WL 1576351, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. May 30, 2007). 
98 Id. at *1, *5. 
99 Id. at *6.  That denial was based on procedural defects in Harrison’s papers; he had not 
sued the proper state officials and his state law claims for breach of contract were barred by 
Florida’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Id. at *3–5. 
100 Id. at *6. 
101 Settlement Agreement at III.A Harrison v. Office of the State Courts Adm’r, No. 6:06-
cv-01878 (M.D. Fla. settled Oct. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Harrison Settlement Agreement], 
available at http://www.law.miami.edu/disabilityservices/pdf/settlement_agreement.pdf.  
The agreement specified that Harrison would be entitled to the provision of real-time 
transcription services in criminal trials 
while he has an impairment which, without mitigating measures, 
substantially limits a major life activity, consistent with decisional case 
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provided that Harrison could request real-time transcription services in 
other criminal proceedings and such requests would be handled on a 
case-by-case basis.102  In addition, Harrison received the sum of $19,600 
from defendants or others on their behalf.103 
B. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Judge 
Richard Brown is the chief judge of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 
the state’s intermediate appellate court.104  Brown was elected to that 
court in 1978 and has served for the last thirty-three years.  He is also 
deaf.105 
Brown lost the hearing in his right ear after a childhood bout with 
the measles; he lost his hearing in his left ear in 1983, when an operation 
to remove a brain tumor left him deaf.106  Prior to the surgery, which he 
knew would likely leave him deaf, Brown worried that his career as a 
judge would be over.107  Brown received a cochlear implant and took 
lipreading classes.  He soon realized that he could continue to serve as a 
judge with appropriate accommodations.108  In court in the 1980s, he 
used a computer captioning system, which delivered text after a seven-
second delay.  Advances in technology have made life in the courtroom 
easier for him.  In addition to lipreading and an updated cochlear 
implant, Brown now uses real-time CART services.109  Brown has a 
judicial assistant who used to be a court reporter and is proficient in 
                                                                                                             
law.  Should Plaintiff undergo any treatment which mitigates his 
hearing impairment such that he no longer is substantially limited in a 
major life activity, he will not be entitled to the accommodation 
provided in this Settlement Agreement. 
Id. at II.D.1.  The Agreement reflects the ruling in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 
471, 493 (1999), that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be 
determined with reference to the ameliorating effects of mitigating measures.  Congress 
overruled Sutton when it enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.  See ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.  The 
Amendment provided that “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially 
limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of 
mitigating measures.”  Id. § 3(4)(E)(i). 
102 Harrison Settlement Agreement, supra note 101, at III.A. 
103 Id. at III.B. 
104 Karen Sloan, Wisconsin Judge Overcomes Hearing Impairment, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 11, 2010, at 
20. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.; see also People in the News, THIRD BRANCH, Winter 2000, at 19, 20, 
http://www.wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch/docs/winter00.pdf. 
107 Sloan, supra note 104, at 20. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
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providing CART services.110  He believes that using CART has made him 
a better judge “since he can take a few extra seconds to mull over 
important motions.”111 
At least two other deaf or hard of hearing lawyers, with appropriate 
accommodations, have also served as judges.  In Delaware, Norman 
Barron served as associate judge on the Superior Court of Delaware.112  
He was appointed to a twelve-year term starting in 1989.113  Barron was 
deaf in one ear since 1968 and lost his hearing completely in his other ear 
in 1997, as a result of Meniere’s disease, a rare inner-ear disorder.  Barron 
uses hearing aids, an FM system, and real-time captioning.114  In an 
interview in 1998, Barron said that his hearing loss “is severe enough 
today that I could not get by without real-time reporting.”115  In that 
interview, Barron said that he believed that courts “have not been in the 
forefront when it comes to accessibility,” but that since the passage of the 
ADA, they have been in “catch-up mode to ensure courtroom 
accessibility for all of our citizens.”116  At the time the article was 
published, Barron had taken a leave of absence to get a cochlear 
implant.117 
In Illinois, Theodore Burtzos served as associate judge of the Cook 
County Circuit Court in the mid-1990s.118  Burtzos lost his hearing in 
1986 as a result of Meniere’s disease.119  Burtzos received a cochlear 
implant and uses real-time captioning.120  Of these three judges, only 
Burtzos became a judge after losing all of his hearing. 
Given the fact that federal judges have life tenure and often serve 
until very advanced ages, it is likely that there are a number of other 
judges who are hard of hearing and use various types of 
accommodations such as amplification devices to assist them in serving 
as judges.  Based on publicly available information, however, these 
judges appear not to self-identify as deaf or hard of hearing.  The lack of 
deaf judges who identify as being deaf is likely the result of the relatively 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 






118 Pat Clawson, Deaf Lawyer Named New Circuit Judge, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1995, at 3; Judy 
Hevrdejs & Mike Conklin, It Looks Like Lawyer Ted Burtzos Again Will Make History, CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 8, 1995, at 16. 
119 Clawson, supra note 118, at 3; Hevrdejs & Conklin, supra note 118, at 16. 
120 Clawson, supra note 118, at 3; Andrew Fegelman, Deaf Lawyer Among 13 New Cook 
Judges, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1995, at 4. 
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few deaf lawyers in the legal profession.  There are far more blind 
judges, for instance, than deaf judges, particularly when it comes to the 
federal courts.121 
But with the benefit of the accommodations available today to 
ensure that deaf judges—like other deaf participants in the judicial 
system—can follow everything that is happening in the courtroom, there 
should be no concern about deaf people not being able to perform the 
role of a judge.  In particular, a concern has been raised about the ability 
of a deaf judge to sit as fact-finder and assess the credibility of a witness 
based on, for instance, the inflection in his voice or pauses in his answers 
to questions on the witness stand. 
The same criticisms were raised about blind judges.  When Richard 
C. Casey was nominated for a federal judgeship, he was asked during 
his confirmation hearing if he would be able to ascertain the credibility 
of a witness if he could not see the witness.122  He responded that there 
was no disadvantage in being blind since the sighted might be distracted 
by a pretty face, hair, or clothing.123  “What it really comes down to is 
whether their story strings together. . . . So I see the real world without 
ever seeing it.”124  Similarly, a deaf judge might not be able to hear 
inflection in a voice or stumbling in an answer from a witness but could 
focus on numerous visual cues and on the words used by a witness to 
determine whether the “story strings together.”125 
It is not surprising that there are no lawsuits involving deaf judges 
suing over lack of accommodations.  Because a judge exercises a great 
deal of control over his or her courtroom, a deaf judge could arrange for 
whatever accommodation he or she deemed most appropriate to assist 
him or her in following the court proceedings.  A deaf judge has the 
advantage of being able to stop a trial or court proceeding if there were 
any problems with the accommodation. 
                                                 
121 For example, the late Richard Conway Casey (United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York), David Tatel (United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit), and Bruce Selya (United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit).  There are also numerous blind state court judges, such as Richard Teitelman 
(Supreme Court of Missouri). 
122 Larry Neumeister, Judge in Abortion Trial Overcomes Personal Obstacles in Successful 




125 See id. 
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C. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Criminal Defendant 
An innocent deaf man spent seven nights in jail in 2005 solely because 
there was not an interpreter available to assist him during 
arraignment.126  Humberto Suarez was mistakenly arrested on a Monday 
evening in August 2005, on a warrant that had been issued for another 
person.127  He was brought to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Courthouse 
on Tuesday morning for arraignment and placed in a holding cell.128  
About an hour and a half later, a police officer “apparently realized that 
[he] was deaf and taped a sign reading ‘DEAF’ to the front of his shirt.  
No other action was taken to alert the court to Suarez’s [deafness].”129  
When Suarez was brought to the courtroom, the court clerk did not 
notice the sign and no one on the court staff realized that Suarez needed 
an interpreter until it was too late to obtain one.  An interpreter was 
requested for Wednesday morning and Suarez was returned to jail.130 
Suarez, for reasons not clear in the record, was put on medical hold 
at the jail and not delivered to court for arraignment on Wednesday, 
Thursday, or Friday mornings.131  He was held over the weekend until 
court opened for session the next Monday morning.132  Suarez was 
brought back to court, but the sheriff’s department did not contact the 
court in advance to arrange for an interpreter.133  Instead, Suarez simply 
arrived with the “DEAF” sign taped to his shirt.134  Again, the court staff 
did not become aware of his presence until it was too late that day to 
arrange for an interpreter.135  Suarez was returned to jail on Monday 
evening and an interpreter was arranged for the next day.136  Suarez was 
finally released on Tuesday when he was arraigned with an American 
Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreter present, at which point it quickly 
became clear that the police had arrested the wrong man.137 
Suarez sued the Superior Court of California for money damages 
under Title II of the ADA.138  As noted above, a plaintiff seeking to 
                                                 
126 Suarez v. Superior Court, 283 F. App’x 470, 471–72 (9th Cir. 2008) (concurring 
opinion). 











138 Id. at 471. 
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recover money damages must prove intentional discrimination on the 
part of the defendant.139  The district court granted summary judgment 
to defendant, finding no evidence of intentional discrimination, and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed that ruling.140  Notwithstanding the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling that Suarez could not show intentional discrimination, 
no one disputed that Suarez, as a deaf criminal defendant facing 
arraignment, had the right to an interpreter. 
Given the threat to liberty inherent in a criminal prosecution, courts 
recognize that due process rights are implicated when a criminal 
defendant is unable to hear or participate meaningfully in the criminal 
proceedings.  It has been settled that the constitutional guarantee of due 
process in a criminal trial “is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
defend against the State’s accusations” and that this guarantee 
encompasses both the rights of a defendant to confront witnesses against 
him and to assist in his own defense.141  In the context of a criminal 
defendant with a disability, the Supreme Court noted in Tennessee v. Lane 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment “guarantee to a criminal 
defendant such as respondent Lane the ‘right to be present at all stages 
of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the 
proceedings’” and a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” by removing 
obstacles to his full participation in judicial proceedings.142 
A number of courts have held that a non-English speaking criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to an interpreter.143  In one leading 
case, the conviction of a Spanish-speaking defendant was vacated 
because he was tried and convicted of murder in New York state court 
without the assistance of an interpreter for much of the trial.144  Finding 
that in the absence of an interpreter, “most of the trial must have been a 
babble of voices” for the defendant, the court held that the trial “lacked 
the basic and fundamental fairness required by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”145  The court held as follows: 
                                                 
139 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
140 Suarez, 283 F. App’x at 471. 
141 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). 
142 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004). 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Yee Soon Shin, 953 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1456 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 
634 (7th Cir. 1985); United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 387 (2d Cir. 
1970). 
144 Negron, 434 F.2d at 387. 
145 Id. at 388, 389. 
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Considerations of fairness, the integrity of the fact-
finding process, and the potency of our adversary 
system of justice forbid that the state should prosecute a 
defendant who is not present at his own trial . . . . And it 
is equally imperative that every criminal defendant—if 
the right to be present is to have meaning—possess 
“sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.”146 
Compared with the abundant case law addressing the rights of non-
English speakers to an interpreter, “[t]here is little case law addressing 
the issue of whether a criminal defendant who is deaf or hearing-
impaired has a constitutional right to an interpreter or some other 
assistance.”147  One of the leading cases is Ferrell v. Estelle, a 1978 case in 
which the Fifth Circuit ordered a new trial for a deaf criminal defendant 
who was denied stenographers to transcribe the spoken words and was 
instead given frequent recesses for the defendant’s lawyer to confer with 
him as to what was happening at trial.148  Noting that the Constitution 
requires “that a defendant sufficiently understand the proceedings 
against him to be able to assist in his own defense,” the Fifth Circuit held 
that the rights of the deaf criminal defendant “were reduced below the 
constitutional minimum.”149  Nevertheless, some courts have been 
reluctant to declare that a deaf criminal defendant has a constitutional 
right to an interpreter.150 
Even if there were no constitutional right of access to the court, the 
statutory bases discussed above would still apply.  In federal court, the 
Court Interpreter Act applies to all cases involving a deaf criminal 
defendant, as a criminal prosecution in federal court must by definition 
be instituted by the United States.151  Despite the concern that rights of 
the deaf in federal court are protected only by judicial policy and not by 
                                                 
146 Id. at 389 (citations omitted) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1962)). 
147 Phillips v. Miller, No. 01 Civ. 1175, 2000 WL 33650803, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2000). 
148 568 F.2d 1128, 1129 (5th Cir. 1978). 
149 Id. at 1132, 1133. 
150 See, e.g., DuQuin v. Cunningham, No. 07CV31, 2009 WL 899434, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 
26, 2009) (“The Supreme Court has not held that a defendant has an absolute right to an 
interpreter and that the failure to provide one at any stage of a criminal prosecution 
violates the constitutional rights of the defendant regardless of whether the lack of an 
interpreter actually prejudiced the defendant.”); Hoke v. Miller, No. 02-CV-0516, 2007 WL 
2292992, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007) (“Petitioner failed to cite and this Court could not 
locate any established Supreme Court precedent indicating that due process demands that 
specific accommodations be made to address a [criminal] defendant’s hearing 
difficulties.”). 
151 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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federal law, that is not the case where a deaf criminal defendant is 
involved.  The ADA and Rehab Act also continue to protect the rights of 
deaf criminal defendants in state courts.152 
It is in the context of the deaf criminal defendant that the issue of 
what accommodation is provided appears to be most significant.  Under 
these statutes, a defendant is not entitled to the accommodation of his 
choice, merely a reasonable accommodation.  Thus, requests by deaf 
criminal defendants for multiple interpreters (one to interpret the 
criminal proceedings and one to interpret conversations between the 
deaf defendant and his counsel), deaf-relay interpreters, or consecutive 
interpretation (rather than simultaneous interpretation) have been 
denied.153  As one court described, “[a]lthough the [appellate court] may 
be right that a deaf-relay interpreter could have been ‘the best’ solution 
to appellant’s lack of hearing, it erred in concluding that the three 
interpreters that the trial judge did use were constitutionally insufficient 
to ensure her due process rights.”154 
It is in this context as well that the concern for those deaf individuals 
with minimal language skills is most prevalent: 
There is a pervasive belief within the legal system that if 
we put an interpreter in front of a deaf person, the 
interpreter will instantly (and perfectly) convert spoken 
language to the appropriate language for the deaf 
person and the communication problem will be solved, 
thereby freeing everyone from further worry or inquiry 
and allowing business to proceed as usual.155 
In reality, as several interesting articles have explored, deaf people with 
minimal language skills have a far more difficult time obtaining 
meaningful communication in criminal proceedings.156 
                                                 
152 See, e.g., Suarez v. Superior Court, 283 F. App’x 470, 471 (9th Cir. 2008) (no dispute 
that plaintiff was entitled to an interpreter under the ADA). 
153 See State v. Wright, 768 N.W.2d 512, 527 (S.D. 2009) (denying request for consecutive 
interpretation); Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (denying 
request for deaf-relay interpreter or certified deaf interpreter). 
154 Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 509. 
155 Michele LaVigne & McCay Vernon, The Deaf Client:  It Takes More Than a Sign—Part 1, 
CHAMPION, June 2005, at 27. 
156 Id. at 28; see also Brandon M. Tuck, Comment, Preserving Facts, Form, and Function 
When a Deaf Witness with Minimal Language Skills Testifies in Court, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 905 
(2010). 
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D. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Civil Litigant 
Joseph Popovich suffered from mild to moderate hearing loss.157  In 
1990, Popovich’s ex-wife sought custody of their daughter by filing a 
motion in the Domestic Relations Division of the Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas (“DRD”), an arm of the State of Ohio.158  During 
a hearing on that motion in August 1992, Popovich informed the referee 
that he was having trouble hearing the proceedings.159  He was then 
given an FM system to accommodate his hearing loss.160  Because the 
headphones caused an ear infection, Popovich requested real-time 
captioning to accommodate his disability.161  In the interim, Popovich—
believing the FM system was ineffective—filed a charge of 
discrimination with the Department of Justice.162  In response to the DOJ 
investigation, the DRD contended that it had met its burden by 
providing the FM system.163  Not until October 1994—two years later—
did the court agree to provide Popovich with real-time captioning.164  He 
was then permitted to visit his daughter, but for reasons that are unclear, 
did not see her until the summer of 1997, five years after she had been 
removed from his custody.165  She had by then turned sixteen.166 
Popovich filed suit against the DRD in 1995, alleging that it 
discriminated against him in violation of Title II of the ADA and 
retaliated against him after he filed a discrimination charge against the 
court with the DOJ.167  In April 1998, a jury returned a verdict for 
Popovich and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of 
$400,000.168  Based on the jury’s finding, the court awarded injunctive 
relief:  (1) requiring the defendants to provide real-time captioning for 
Popovich in the state custody matter; (2) enjoining the defendants from 
discriminating against him in connection with providing any auxiliary 
aids; and (3) enjoining the defendants from retaliating against him.169  On 
appeal to the Sixth Circuit and a subsequent rehearing en banc, the court 
                                                 
157 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 227 F.3d 627, 630 (6th Cir. 
2000). 
158 Id. at 629. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 630. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
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addressed whether Ohio was immune from suit under the Eleventh 
Amendment, an issue subsequently resolved by the United States 
Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Lane.170  In the en banc decision, the Sixth 
Circuit vacated the jury verdict and remanded for a new trial on 
Popovich’s claims of retaliation and unreasonable exclusion from 
participation at trial.171  Following the Tennessee v. Lane decision, 
Popovich moved to reinstate the $400,000 jury verdict; defendants 
moved for summary judgment on the disability and retaliation claims.172  
After both motions were denied,173 the case ultimately settled before 
retrial.174 
Popovich raises the interesting question of whether a deaf person is 
entitled to the accommodation that he seeks (real-time transcription), as 
opposed to a lesser accommodation that the court believes is sufficient 
(an FM system).  There was no dispute that the ADA governed the 
request and that the court was obligated to provide some form of 
accommodation.  The issue was what accommodation was to be 
provided.  As noted above, the public entity must give “primary 
consideration” to the accommodation requested but is not then obligated 
to provide that accommodation.175  Nevertheless, the accommodation 
provided must be adequate to permit the deaf individual meaningful 
access to the court proceedings. 
In a more recent case raising the issue of when an accommodation 
request should be decided, a deaf man and his neighbor filed dueling 
civil claims involving a trespass action.176  Neighbor Terry Strook 
brought a complaint against Dean Kedinger, a deaf man; Kedinger 
asserted cross-claims and counterclaims.177  Prior to the first hearing in 
the case, Kedinger called the court via TTY to request a sign language 
                                                 
170 Id. at 641–42; see also Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 
808 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc).  The author of this Article (along with other lawyers) 
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Popovich to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003 in 
Medical Board of California v. Hason, 537 U.S. 1231 (2003), a case dealing with Congress’s 
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in enacting Title II of the ADA.  Hason was 
withdrawn by Petitioner, the Medical Board of California, and the issue presented in Hason 
was decided a year later by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Lane. 
171 Popovich, 276 F.3d at 818. 
172 Memorandum Opinion & Order at 4–5, Popovich v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Court of 
Common Pleas (N.D. Ohio filed Sept. 30, 2004) (No. 1:95-cv-684) (on file with author); 
Order at 1–2, Popovich v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Court of Common Pleas (N.D. Ohio filed Mar. 
25, 2005) (No. 1:95-cv-684) (on file with author). 
173 See id. 
174 Order, Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (N.D. Ohio filed Oct. 
12, 2006) (No. 1:95-cv-684). 
175 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A, comment to § 35.160 (2010). 
176 Strook v. Kedinger, 766 N.W.2d 219, 221–22 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). 
177 Id. at 222. 
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interpreter.178  When Kedinger was told that an interpreter would not be 
provided, he indicated that he would not attend the hearing.179  Kedinger 
subsequently filed a motion requesting a sign language interpreter and 
stated that he would not appear at the hearing without an interpreter 
being provided for him.180  No indication was ever provided to Kedinger 
that his request for an interpreter would be considered at the hearing, 
although he had been denied an interpreter for the hearing itself.181  
Because Kedinger did not attend the hearing, the court struck his cross-
claims and counterclaims.182 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Brown 
(himself a deaf judge), held that the trial court had violated Title II of the 
ADA, as well as state law and due process, by failing to hold a hearing to 
address Kedinger’s request for a sign language interpreter.183  The Court 
of Appeals held that once Kedinger properly notified the court that he 
needed an interpreter, the trial court was required to act on that request 
by obtaining an interpreter or setting a hearing date to determine the 
need for the interpreter.184  Both “due process” and “the interests of 
justice” demanded that Kedinger be notified that the court would 
consider his request for an interpreter at the hearing.185 
Also, the Court of Appeals held that it was an improper exercise of 
discretion for the trial court to hear the interpreter issue together with 
the substantive merits.186  If an accommodation is necessary, it should be 
in place before the substantive proceeding.187  The court held that it puts 
the disabled person between a “rock and the hard place” to have to 
appear for “an important proceeding to determine liberty or property 
interests not knowing whether the requested accommodation is going to 
be granted.”188  Because courts are public entities “that must be 
accessible to all,” the deaf person “should not have to worry about access 
issues when preparing for the substantive hearing.”189 
Finally, while the trial court appeared to view lipreading and written 
notes as sufficient for Kedinger to participate in the proceedings, the 
Court of Appeals held that such accommodations did not provide 
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181 Id. at 228. 
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183 Id. at 227–29. 
184 Id. at 228. 
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effective communication within the meaning of the ADA.190  As a result, 
the appellate court required the trial court to conduct a hearing on 
whether Kedinger should be provided with an interpreter.191  While 
suggesting that perhaps a real-time reporter would be an appropriate 
accommodation, the appellate court held, “[i]t is up to the circuit court 
on remand to discover Kedinger’s capabilities and the best form of 
communication and go from there.”192  Following that hearing, the trial 
court would then have to redo the case from the beginning.193 
E. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Juror 
There has been a long and unfortunate history in this country of 
discrimination against jurors on the basis of disability.  Many states once 
had statutes on the books that prevented deaf or hard of hearing 
individuals from even serving as jurors.  Now, the ADA covers jury duty 
in state and local courts even where a state may still have a 
discriminatory or exclusionary statute on its books. 
In federal court, the Judicial Conference policy specifies that it does 
not govern “[t]he determination of whether a prospective juror with a 
communications disability is legally qualified to serve as a juror.”194  
Rather, such a determination is left for “the judgment of the trial court 
under the Jury Selection and Service Act. . . . However, where an 
individual with a communications disability is found so qualified, a sign 
language interpreter or other appropriate auxiliary aid or service should 
be provided under these guidelines.”195 
In contrast to the history of discrimination against the deaf and hard 
of hearing in jury service, today there are few cases in which a juror who 
is deaf or hard of hearing sues on the ground that he has been denied the 
right to serve as a juror on account of his disability. It is possible that this 
is because people are often happy to be excused from jury duty.  Cases in 
recent years concerning the rights of deaf and hard of hearing 
individuals to sit on juries tend to arise because a criminal defendant 
seeks to challenge the exclusion of a deaf or hard of hearing juror or 
argues that the inclusion of such a juror denied him his right to a fair 
trial.196 
                                                 
190 Id. at 230–31. 
191 Id. at 232. 
192 Id. at 231. 
193 Id. at 232. 
194 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE GUIDELINES, supra note 33. 
195 Id. 
196 See infra notes 197216 and accompanying text (identifying recent cases involving the 
rights of deaf and hard of hearing jurors). 
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A defendant in a 2005 case appealed his conviction because the court 
had struck a deaf venireperson based on the court’s inability to 
accommodate the venireperson’s disability.197  The trial court did not 
find that the venireperson was unqualified to serve as a juror because of 
his deafness.198  Rather, the deaf venireperson was struck because only 
one sign language interpreter was available for voir dire when two were 
needed to provide accommodations given that the interpreter could not 
go for more than an hour without a break.199  The appellate court held 
that the trial court did not have the discretion to strike the deaf 
venireperson once the court had determined that he was qualified to 
serve as a juror.200  Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed the 
conviction because the venireperson, who was juror number twenty-
seven, could not have been selected for the jury, which consisted of 
twelve of the first twenty-four venirepersons.201 
Likewise, a losing defendant in a 2006 disability discrimination case 
challenged the trial court’s decision to strike a potential juror with a 
hearing loss.202  At voir dire, the juror stated that she had ringing in her 
ears and could not hear people when they turned around or lowered 
their voices.203  She refused to use a hearing aid, indicated that she would 
not benefit from moving to the front row, and had difficulty 
understanding the judge who was sitting three or four feet away.204  The 
Third Circuit therefore found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s 
decision to excuse the juror.205 
The cases discussed above stand for the relatively straightforward 
proposition that a qualified juror whose deafness can be accommodated 
should not be struck, while a juror who could not follow a trial even with 
accommodations should be excused.  A more troubling example comes 
when a court excuses a deaf or hard of hearing juror based on a 
determination that the evidence in a case requires some degree of 
hearing to assess. 
In a 2008 case, the challenge to the seating of a hard of hearing juror 
turned on her ability to assess a recording of a 911 call.206  At voir dire, 
the juror indicated that she needed to read lips in order to understand 
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what was being said at trial.207  She was moved to the front of the jury 
box and, several times during trial, asked that counsel turn toward her 
when they were speaking.208  The defendant moved for the juror to be 
struck for cause but was denied.209  The defendant had four peremptory 
challenges but used those to strike other potential jurors, thus leading to 
the juror with the hearing loss being included in the jury panel.210 
After the defendant was convicted, he complained that the trial court 
erred in not striking for cause the juror with the hearing loss.211  The 
appellate court found that the juror could not have properly evaluated 
the evidence presented because much of the determination as to the 
defendant’s guilt turned on a 911 tape that had been played for the 
jury.212  Although the juror could read the words as they had been 
transcribed, she could not “listen to appellant’s speech patterns, the 
inflections in his voice, the pauses in the conversation, and many other 
audio clues that would be meaningful only if actually heard.”213  The 
written transcript of the tape, the court found, “would not have 
conveyed the nuance and inflection imparted by the spoken words.”214  
The court therefore held that the juror should have been excused for 
cause and reversed the conviction.215 
The court’s finding that a deaf or hard of hearing juror lacked the 
ability to assess the credibility of the evidence is precisely the kind of 
slippery slope that courts should take care to avoid.  Few would dispute 
that there are likely some cases where a deaf juror ought not to be on a 
jury panel, such as a case where the guilt of a defendant turns on 
whether his voice matches the voice on a recording (though with today’s 
technology, it would likely be possible to render a visual comparison of 
two different excerpts of sound).216  Nevertheless, courts should make 
every effort to find a way for that juror to participate and meaningfully 
weigh the evidence, so as to avoid the situation where deaf jurors 
become routinely excused solely for reasons relating to their deafness. 
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216 Cf. Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12, 18 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1993) (recognizing 
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F. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Witness 
Deaf and hard of hearing witnesses face an interesting limitation on 
their right to accommodations in federal court.  While the federal policy 
adopted by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
includes “witnesses” in the definition of those who are entitled to 
accommodations under the policy, a later section implies that 
accommodations for deaf witnesses need to be provided only during the 
duration of that individual’s participation in the proceeding.217  In a 
section discussing real-time reporting as an appropriate accommodation, 
the policy provides that “real-time reporting should be provided for only 
as long as and for the specific purposes required by a participant:  for 
example, only for the duration of the deaf witness’s testimony.”218 
On the one hand, the policy is sensible in that the deaf witness is 
often going to participate in the judicial proceeding only when he is 
testifying and therefore does not need accommodations before or after 
his participation.  In some proceedings witnesses may be barred from 
viewing the testimony of other witnesses out of concern that they will 
shape their testimony to that of other witnesses.219  This approach is 
consistent with the federal policy’s treatment of spectators.  As discussed 
below, the policy denies spectators accommodations altogether, except in 
situations in which the court determines that it is appropriate to provide 
such accommodations.220  When a witness is not testifying, he is merely a 
spectator, so it makes sense to treat him as one.  On the other hand, the 
witness is more than just a spectator.  The witness is an interested 
participant in the proceeding and may wish to be present for parts of the 
proceeding that are relevant to his testimony to the extent that is 
permissible. 
In state court, the ADA and Rehab Act apply equally to deaf 
witnesses and spectators as to other participants at trial.221  When a 
witness is not testifying in a judicial proceeding, he is still entitled to an 
accommodation as a spectator. 
                                                 
217 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE GUIDELINES, supra note 33. 
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G. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Spectator 
In June 2004, Bruce Rafford, who is hard of hearing, requested real-
time captioning during his adult son’s civil commitment trial (brought in 
county court) as a sexually violent predator.222  Rafford was a spectator 
at the trial—he did not participate as a witness.223  The presiding 
Snohomish County (Washington) Superior Court Judge Richard Thorpe 
and county administrators declined to provide real-time captioning and 
instead provided an assistive listening device.224  Following the 
conclusion of his son’s trial, Rafford brought suit in federal court against 
Thorpe and Snohomish County under Title II of the ADA, the Rehab Act, 
and Washington state law for denying him his requested 
accommodation and participation in a government service.225 
The federal court found that “[t]here appears to be no published 
caselaw that addresses a court’s obligation to provide auxiliary aids to 
accommodate a hearing-impaired spectator,” as opposed to participants 
in the trial process such as litigants and jurors.226  Reviewing the 
language of the DOJ regulations implementing Title II, the court held 
(and defendants did not challenge) that “attending a trial as a spectator 
is a ‘service, program, or activity’ to which the regulation applies.”227 
The court found that Judge Thorpe declined to provide real-time 
captioning because he believed that it “could be confusing” and because 
of the potential that Rafford “would audibly object during the 
proceedings and disrupt the trial.”228  The defendants did not argue that 
real-time captioning was unavailable or that it would be too expensive or 
burdensome to provide it.229  Because the court found that Judge Thorpe 
did not give “primary consideration” to the accommodation that Rafford 
requested and did not “investigate whether [the] requested 
accommodation [was] reasonable,” the court held that a jury could 
potentially find that Judge Thorpe violated the ADA.230 
Based on Rafford’s affidavit that even with the assistive listening 
device, “he could not hear entire portions of the proceedings,” the court 
also held that there was an issue of fact as to whether the assistive 
listening device “was a reasonable accommodation and whether plaintiff 
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was able to participate equally in the proceedings” compared to other 
spectators.231  The court thus permitted Rafford’s claim for declaratory 
relief (a declaration that defendants had unlawfully discriminated 
against plaintiff by refusing to provide real-time captioning for his son’s 
trial) to proceed.232 
The court granted judgment for defendants on Rafford’s claim for 
injunctive relief to enjoin defendants from denying him real-time 
captioning in court proceedings because the trial was over and there was 
no evidence that plaintiff planned to attend other proceedings.233  In 
addition, the court granted judgment for defendants on Rafford’s claim 
for monetary damages, finding that there was no evidence of intentional 
discrimination.234  The court found that Judge Thorpe and the county 
had provided an assistive listening device, which was the same 
accommodation Rafford had requested for his son’s previous trial in 
1992, and made various efforts to remedy the problem when Rafford 
complained that the assistive listening device was ineffective.235  Rafford 
appealed the district court’s dismissal of his claims for monetary 
damages premised on intentional discrimination.236  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal, agreeing with the district court that “Rafford 
failed to present evidence that the County was deliberately indifferent to 
his request for a reasonable accommodation.”237 
As this decision makes clear, deaf spectators, like other deaf 
participants in court proceedings, are entitled to reasonable 
accommodations under the ADA and the Rehab Act.  Those statutes 
make no distinction between spectators and other participants.  
However, in federal courts, the Judicial Conference policy does not apply 
to deaf spectators.238  In adopting the written guidelines prepared by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Judicial 
Conference specifically noted that the policy “does not apply to 
spectators.”239  Similarly, the written policy provides that “[t]he services 
called for under these guidelines are not required to be provided to 
                                                 
231 Id. at *4. 
232 Id. at *1, *6. 
233 Id. at *2. 
234 Id. at *1, *4. 
235 Id. at *4. 
236 Rafford v. Snohomish County, No. 08-35884, 349 F. App’x 245, 246 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 
2009). 
237 Id. (citing Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001); Memmer v. 
Marin County Courts, 169 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
238 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE GUIDELINES, supra note 33. 
239 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
supra note 32, at 14. 
Pravda: Understanding the Rights of Deaf and Hard of Hearing Individuals
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
964 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
spectators.”240  However, the policy does contain an exception to this 
rule.  It provides that “courts may elect to [provide accommodations to 
spectators] in situations where they determine such to be appropriate, 
for example, providing an interpreter to the deaf spouse of a criminal 
defendant so that the spouse may follow the course of the trial.”241  Had 
Rafford’s son’s civil commitment trial been in a federal court rather than 
county court, this exception in the policy likely would have applied to 
him. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
This Article shows that there have been significant advances in the 
legal rights to accommodations of deaf and hard of hearing participants 
in the judicial process.  There have also been significant advances in the 
technology to provide accommodations.  Despite these significant 
advances in both the law and technology, it is often lack of knowledge 
that is the biggest obstacle today to the ability of deaf and hard of 
hearing participants in the judicial system to enjoy meaningful right of 
access to the courts.  For instance, Mosier, Harrison, Suarez, Popovich, 
Kedinger, and others whose stories are described here were plainly 
entitled to accommodations under the ADA and Rehab Act. 
Lack of knowledge on the part of state officials of the relevant law 
may very well have been a reason that the states resisted providing the 
required accommodations.242  Lack of knowledge of the technologies is 
also an issue.  As one deaf lawyer recognized, “the problem those of us 
with hearing impairments face is not so much resistance to the idea of 
accommodations, but rather ignorance on the facility’s part (and 
sometimes that of the hearing impaired person) as to what technology is 
available, and how to use it.”243 
The continuing growth in the population of deaf lawyers and deaf 
judges may be among the single greatest factors that will lead to stronger 
enforcement of legal rights of the deaf and hard of hearing.  It is no 
coincidence, for instance, that a ringing endorsement of Dean Kedinger’s 
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right to meaningful access and an effective accommodation was written 
by Judge Brown of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.  As more judges, 
court clerks, and others who routinely make accommodations decisions 
become more familiar with the idea of deaf participants in the legal 
system—particularly in the context of deaf lawyers and deaf judges, who 
are likely to be knowledgeable about their rights and about the available 
technologies—that familiarity should lead to greater compliance with the 
legal rights of the deaf to meaningful access to the judicial system. 
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